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Physics  and  spirituality: 
the  next  grand  unification? 
Brian Josephson 
I n  what light should  a  scientist  regard  the  assertions 
of a  religion, or of religions in general?  One  extreme 
position is the atheistic one of regarding the asser- 
tions of religion as falsehoods. Such a position can 
be  sustained only by regarding  the  xperiences 
which individuals consider as validating their reli- 
gious  beliefs  as  being  explicable in other ways and, 
in the  absence of an  adequate  research  programme 
to support it, must be considered more as falling 
within the field of opinion than as within that of 
science. 
The alternative to this atheistic position is that 
there exists an aspect of reality-that we may for 
convenience call  transcendental-which embraces 
the  subject  matter of religion (or as  some may prefer 
to term i t ,  the spiritual aspect of life) and which is 
not at present encompassed by science. The ques- 
tion  then  arises  whether  some  future  science  may be 
able to cope with this  aspect of reality, or whether it 
will remain  forever  beyond  the  scope of science.  The 
general aim of science  being  to  gain as full and 
accurate  a  picture of reality as possible,  one  would 
expect logically that  scientists in  general  would  take 
a  keen  interest in  such  questions.  just  as  they do in 
topics  such  as  those of the  fundamental  constitution 
of matter,  or of the  mechanisms of life. In practice. 
however, such questions have been almost entirely 
split off from scientific consciousness. in some  cases 
as  a  result of an  atheistic  point of view and in others 
because  present  science  seems  to  be so far  removed 
from anything spiritual that the suggestion of the 
possibility of a  merging of the  two  seems  improbable 
or even  absurd. 
While i t  may have been the case that such ques- 
tions have been split off from scientific conscious- 
ness in general,  there  has  been  a significant minority 
of scientists  who  have  tried  to  apply  the  methods of 
thought  and  analysis of the  scientist  to  those  aspects 
of reality that (unless one adopts as an article of 
faith  the  idea  that all these  aspects will in  due  course 
either be explained or 'explained away' within the 
current  framework)  seem  to lie outside  the  scope of 
science in its present  form.  At  the  present  time we 
can see the emergence of something which, while 
not being  exactly  a  consensus of opinion,  at  any  rate 
forms  a  collection of mutually  consistent  ideas  as  to 
the  general  form of a possible new  understanding of 
nature, and of what might constitute appropriate 
means of investigating  nature.  that  goes  beyond  and 
is more flexible than is the  current  conventional 
framework.  These  ideas  are  not well represented in 
the  standard  literature-probably, in the last analy- 
sis,  because  they  represent  the  same kind of threat 
to  current scientific dogmas  as scientific discoveries 
have  presented  to  religious  dogmas in the  past. 
(There has even been a suggestion, in the editorial 
pages of a  prestigious scientific journal,  that  a  par- 
ticular  book  should be burnt  because it propagated 
dangerous  ideas.) 
It will be my task in what follows to explain the 
ways in which current scientific orthodoxies  are 
being challenged and to convey some idea of the 
alternatives presently emerging. A number of im- 
portant themes here include the questions of the 
validity of reductionism  and  the universality of 
quantum  mechanics,  as well as that of the  relevance 
of mystical experience. My own  thoughts in this area 
have  been  much  influenced by the writings of David 
Bohm (1980) and  Fritjof  Capra (1975). I have 
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benefited also from discussions with a number of 
scientific colleagues,  including in particular  Michael 
Conrad, Dipankar Home, H R Nagendra. Steven 
Rosen and Richard Thompson, as well as with the 
members of two  spiritual  movements  that  have 
attempted  to  elaborate  suitable  concepts in the  area 
being  discussed  (the  Transcendental  Meditation 
movement  and  the  Brahma  Kumaris  World  Spiritual 
University). 
The validity of reductionism 
One of the  points of tension  between  orthodoxy  and 
the new thinking is the question of the extent to 
which the  approach of reductionism  (i.e.  studying  a 
complex system in terms of its component parts) 
remains  a valid one in quantum  mechanics.  Suppor- 
ters of reductionism quote various examples from 
physics (e.g.  phenomena of the solid state)  and  from 
chemistry  (e.g.  explaining  the  properties of a  mole- 
cule) as proof that the reductionist approach still 
applies despite the conceptual changes wrought by 
quantum mechanics. In other situations, however, 
the  reductionistic  approach  (with its implication  that 
the  properties of a  system  can be satisfactorily  deter- 
mined by observation of that system alone) breaks 
down. Consider, for example. the following situa- 
tion. A colleague B sends us a beam of polarised 
particles which are individually polarised according 
to a rule that he alone knows. We cannot find out 
exactly how each particle in the beam is polarised 
because an observation of one component of the 
spin will  in general alter the values of the other 
components. And yet we cannot say (as is often 
permissible in  quantum mechanics) that the indi- 
vidual  spins  are  undefined, since in this case  a
perfectly  definite spin has  been given to  each  parti- 
cle by our colleague B. This example shows in the 
simplest  possible way how in the  quantum  domain it 
is possible that  information outside a system may be 
needed  before  a ful l  description of that system can 
be  given,  thus  contradicting  the  reductionist  point of
view. 
The example just given displays a common fea- 
ture of many of the arguments that support ortho- 
doxy, namely that the successful applications of a 
particular  principle  are  emphasised, while the  situa- 
tions  where  the  principle  cannot  be successfully 
applied or where  there  are  some difficulties with the 
standard view are ignored or overlooked, creating 
thus  a  distorted  account of the  true  situation. 
A very  similar situation  to  that  just  described,  but 
one which is of considerably more practical rele- 
vance, was  given by Niels Bohr (1958) who  observed 
that  the  uncertainty  principle  would  ultimately limit 
the  degree  to which one  could  understand bio- 
systems in terms of the  methods of quantum 
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mechanics. If we try to  overcome our  ignorance 
regarding  the  internal  nature  and  constitution of the 
biosystem under  study by performing  suitable 
observations, then we must at some point come up 
with a problem like that previously encountered. 
namely  that  observing  a system disturbs i t  slightly at 
the  quantum  level.  Biosystems  are  examples of sys- 
tems  where,  just as in the  case  considered  above. we 
do  not  have  the  degree of control  over  the  internal 
structure of the system under investigation that we 
d o  in general have in  physics and chemistry. In  the 
example previously given. a colleague determined 
the  state of the system in a way not accessible to us 
in  detail; in  the  case of biosystems  nature  does 
precisely the  same  thing. 
Biosystems  illustrate again the way successful ap- 
plications of a particular principle are emphasised 
while the  situations  where  problems  occur  are 
ignored or overlooked.  Conventional  thinking 
works  adequately  at  the  molecular  level,  where  the 
change of the structure through observation is not 
an overwhelming  problem. I t  would  become a 
problem,  however, if  we were  to try to explain 
biosystems in  detail at the level of the wave func- 
tion.  The successes of molecular biology in no way 
detract from the force of Bohr’s argument, which 
applies in  a regime different from that with which 
biology is currently  concerned. 
The universality or otherwise of quantum  mechanics 
The  question of the universality of quantum  theory 
has  been  discussed in detail by David  Bohm (1980). 
He considers as an illustrative example the way in  
which insurance companies use statistical tables to 
predict  the  probability  that  a given person will die of 
a specified disease within a specified time period. 
The existence of these  statistical laws in no way 
excludes  the possibility of other laws existing which 
would determine  the  precise  conditions of death of a 
given individual policy holder  (e.g.  death  caused by 
an accident, the details of which are in  principle 
describable by the laws of mechanics).  Similarly. 
Brownian motion can be described either statisti- 
cally or in terms of the motions of the individual 
atoms in an  individual  instance of an  experiment. 
Analogously,  one can argue  that no contradiction 
is involved in  supposing that under suitable condi- 
tions  alternative  descriptions of systems to the  quan- 
tum  mechanical  ones may be  possible,  and  that 
possession of these descriptions might permit par- 
ticular  predictions  to  be  made  that  were  more 
definite than those which quantum mechanics pro- 
vides.  Bohm  notes  that many  physicists retain  a 
belief that such ideas are not to be taken seriously 
because of the arguments against them that have 
been made in the past. These arguments have now 
been shown to be invalid and they can in  fact be 
refuted  irectly by means of explicit counter- 
examples. 
The  question of the  universality of quantum 
mechanics is closely bound  up with the issue of 
measurement.  Does  the  measurement  heory of 
quantum  mechanics  (Dirac 19%) give a  satisfactory 
account of the  outcome of all possible experiments, 
as is often  asserted, or not?  The  facts of the  situation 
are confused by the fact that a physics experiment 
constitutes  a special  situation.  An  experiment is 
normally set up specifically to find out information 
that  can  be  interpreted in the light of current physi- 
cal theories  and  thus  ultimately in terms of quantum 
mechanics. I t  should be no surprise. then, to find 
that the measurements done in practice are ones 
that  conform  to  the  idea of measurement  prescribed 
by the quantum theory and there is no reason to 
conclude from this fact (as those who hold to the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics 
do) that the quantum mechanical theory of mea- 
surement  provides  a  theory of all conceivable 
measurement  processes.  There is no  real  reason why 
all information gathering devices. and in particular 
devices  based  on  different  concepts  as  to  what kind 
of information is being  gathered.  should fit into  the 
formal  scheme  provided by the  quantum  mechanical 
theory of measurement, which is based  on  the 
assumption  that  to  every  measurement is associated 
a specific Hermitian  operator. 
Complementary  descriptions 
The  probable  inapplicability of the  reductionistic 
and quantum mechanical modes of description in 
certain  areas of nature  serves  to  focus ou r  attention 
on the possibility already mentioned that descrip- 
tions of nature may exist that supplement the con- 
ventional  quantum  echanical  one.  A  detailed 
working  out of this  idea  has  been given by Michael 
Conrad,  Dipankar  Home  and myself (Conrad et a1 
19x6). to which source the reader is referred for a 
fuller  account of the  ideas  than  can  be given in the 
space available here. In this paper we noted firstly 
that  descriptions in science  (and  also  the  methods of 
observation  to be used)  are  not  necessarily absolute 
in the sense of being equally suitable for use in all 
situations. For example. in a biological context, 
where  some kind of selection  process  has  been effec- 
tive.  terms such as  perception,  purposive  behaviour, 
decision making, learning or adaptation are often 
very useful, although such terminology is not suit- 
able for systems in general. In the same way, one 
may hypothesise  that  the  language of quantum 
mechanics  may  properly  apply  only in a limiting case 
where  some  regular  order (which it may be helpful 
to think of as being analogous to the order in a 
crystal)  makes  for  particular  mathematical  sim- 
plifications.  We  gain  then  a  consistent view of nature 
in which the two categories of description comple- 
ment  each  other;  neither  on its own  containing  the 
full story.  This  feature of complementarity  contrasts 
with the conventional hypothesis that of the two 
descriptions  the  quantum  mechanical is fundamental 
while biological descriptions are derivative. 
One  can  go  further:  the  conceptual  picture which 
has just been described allows in principle a deep 
I God is subtle but he is not bloodyminded 
, (translation of Raffiniert  ist  der  Herr  Gott,  aber 
1 boshaft ist er nicht) 
' God casts  the  die, not the dice. 
Albert  Einstein quoted in  The Harvest of a Quiet 
€ye (Bristol:  The  Institute of Physics 1977) 
God not only  plays  dice. He also  sometimes 
throws  the dice where  they  cannot be seen. 
Stephen  Hawking quoted in the The  Harvest o f a  
Quiet  Eye (Bristol:  The  Institute of Physics 1977) 
unification of biological phenomena and quantum 
phenomena (cf Stapp 1082. Villars 1983). I n  this 
conceptual  unification.  a  concept in the  one  mode of 
description, such as the making of a choice. goes 
over in  the other description into a corresponding 
concept  (which in this  particular  instance is the 
collapse of the wave function). This unification is 
reminiscent of Einstein's unltication of gravitation 
and  inertia. in that in it  two  phenomena  that  are  at 
first sight completely  different in nature  are  seen  to 
be  ultimately  the  same. By virtue of this unification 
it  can  be  said  that  certain  features of quantum 
mechanics  become  comprehensible in their  own 
right,  rather  than having to  be  arbitrarily  postulated 
as  axioms. 
The  complementarity  idea may be  particularly 
relevant  to  the  phenomenon of the  effectiveness of 
performance of biosystems. The picture proposed 
leads to the possibility that the asymmetric kind of 
order which exists in biosystems  as  a  result of selec- 
tion processes may not have the kind of regularity 
that quantum mechanics describes, and hence may 
well not fit into  the  quantum  mechanical  scheme.  As 
a result, for biosystems quantum mechanics might 
be  systematically in error. Since the  general effect of 
natural selection is to improve the performance of 
biosystems  over  the  time, it might be  expected  that 
biosystems would be more effective than quantum 
mechanics  would  lead  one  to  expect.  This, if we like 
to  think of i t  in these  terms, is a valid way of 
introducing  into  science  ideas  that  are  collateral with 
vitalism.  In  this  connection it may be  noted  that  the 
arguments  that  have  been  presented in  this section, 
suggesting  that biological descriptions  and  quantum 
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descriptions  may  complement  each  other,  go  a  long 
way towards legitimising the unorthodox approach 
of Sheldrake (1981), who  regards  certain biological 
concepts such as that of a morphogenetic field (a 
field postulated to account for the development of 
form)  as  being  fundamental. 
An important  moral  to  be  drawn  from  the  above 
discussion is that  one  should  not  overstress  the  value 
of mathematical  analysis in  science. In  the biological 
sciences we find concrete  illustrations of the  fact  that 
science can sometimes proceed very well without 
any  equations. I t  may  be  an  overidealisation to 
presume that one can always make a precise con- 
nection  between  concrete physical  reality and  a
mathematical  object of some  kind;  some  aspects of 
reality  may  be  better  captured by other,  nonmathe- 
matical, types of conceptual entity. These can lead 
to models which can be tested just as successfully 
against reality as can models based on equations. 
Introspection as a scientific tool 
We  can  t ke  thid a of complementary 
descriptions-which, as exemplified by the descrip- 
tions  found in biology,  are  ‘softer’  than  the  numeri- 
cal  descriptions used in physics and chemistry-one 
stage  further by taking  account of descriptions of the 
inner reality which is found by introspection.  Discus- 
sion of this more delicate experiencing of reality, 
which includes  what is commonly called mystical 
experience, serves to bring the topic back again to 
the  subject of physics and  faith,  the  overall  theme of 
this issue of Physics Education. Here  Fritjof  Capra 
has  been  a  leading figure in promoting  the view that 
mystical experience  complements  the  knowledge of 
reality that we gain through the use of orthodox 
scientific methods  (Capra 1975). In  this context the 
question  immediately  arises  whether, in  talking 
about introspective knowledge in general and mys- 
ticism in particular, we may not be  venturing  outside 
the boundaries of what is legitimate in science. I 
shall respond to this question by posing another. 
which is dependent on the fact that, although mys- 
tical experience is not an element in current  science, 
mathematics  certainly is. The  question is. why 
should the thinking involved in doing mathematics 
(which is as  introspective in character,  as is meditat- 
ing) should  serve as a  legitimate  component of scien- 
ce, while mystical experience  does  not? 
If this  question  seems  a  strange  one  to  the  reader. 
this is almost  certainly  because  the  meditative  states 
of the mystic are not recognised parts of his life, 
even though he has in  fact probably experienced 
them  to  some  degree on particular  occasions.  Some- 
one who is familiar with such experiences, on the 
other  hand, will see  the  question of legitimacy to  be 
misconceived; rather the questions that arise relate 
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more  to  how  one  may  overcome  the  problems  that 
face one in obtaining ‘good’ data and to how t o  
integrate mystical knowledge adequately with our 
ordinary  frames of reference. 
The  primary  goal of meditation is not  that of 
gaining  intellectual  knowledge  capable of being 
formulated  compactly in  terms of words. but rather 
that of gaining  through  the  experience a new  kind o f  
perception  and  understanding of reality that will 
transform  the ways a  person  acts in life.  But it  is by 
no means  the  case  that no propositions in words  can 
be made about such experiences, and indeed the 
literature of mystical experience is extensive. It is 
not  feasible in  the  space of this  article to attempt  to 
give the  reader  any  detailed vision of what this  kind 
of knowledge is like,  but I can  recommend  study of a 
work such as the classical Yoga Sutras of’ Patanjnli 
(trans. in Shearer 1982) as  possibly providing a faint 
h i n t  as to  the kind of thoughts  that  are  involved. 
The interpretation of what  mystics have  written is 
complicated by the fact that different mystics have 
used many  different  languages  and  different  styles of 
description, while  again different mystics have 
spoken on the basis of different levels of develop- 
ment.  Indeed.  more  and  more  clarity of mind is 
necessary before the subtler perceptions of mystic- 
ism can be understood and realised, paralleling the 
way that  clarity of mind is required in  order  to  work 
with subtle muthemutical concepts. I f  one  under- 
stands  these  facts.  and  avoids such traps  as  presum- 
ing to be able  to  judge  the  various  aspects of mystic- 
ism without having had the relevant experience o r  
training.  one will in all probability  be  able  to  recog- 
nise that  there is indeed  a  consistent  body of know- 
ledge  that  can be gained  through this deeper  means 
of introspection. 
As to the significance of mystical experience,  the 
natural  reaction of the physicist is to debar  conscious 
Tru th  is ever  to be found in simplicity, and not in  
the multiplicity and confusion of things . . .  He is 
the God of order  and not of confusion 
Isaac Newton 
experience  from  the framework of discussion 
altogether. This may be satisfactory as far as the 
study of matter is concerned (although not even in  
that  case  if,  as  Wigner has suggested,  consciousness 
collapses wave functions). but it  becomes a dubious 
doctrine if  the conscious individual himself is o u r  
subject of interest. It is a  natural  extension of argu- 
ments  previously given to  consider  that  descriptions 
of a  conscious  individual in quantum  mechanical 
terms  may  have to be  supplemented by descriptions 
in terms of his thought  processes,  just  as  previously 
i t  was proposed  that  similar  supplementation may be 
necessary for the case of nonconscious biosystems. 
From a general viewpoint. when we describe our 
thought processes we are describing some of the 
mechanics involved in the expression in  action of 
o u r  intelligence. Logically. the subtler experiences 
of mysticism can  also be interpreted  as  being  a  part 
of the  workings of intelligence in nature  (which 
characterisation can. in  principle, also include the 
divine intelligence). Because of our consciousness 
we can have direct knowledge of these processes 
that is not accessible to the usual means of investiga- 
t i o n  of science  and. as previously  noted, i t  is illogical 
to rule out this kind of knowledge while accepting 
the use of mathematics. 
Paths for the future 
1 have here presented the reader with a  number of 
concepts  that  are  quite  far  emoved  from  those 
found in traditional ways of thinking. I have sug- 
gested in the first place  that  there is no good  reason 
to suppose that the current physical laws represent 
the end of the road for science. It is largely the 
limitations on thinking that the current framework 
imposes (especially in  view of the standard advice 
that it is best not to worry about the meaning of 
quantum  mechanics)  that  make i t  impossible  to  see 
that i t  is  in fact quite a restricted framework for 
viewing nature as a whole. Secondly, complement- 
arity  and  concepts  associated with complementarity 
seem to be crucial for handling the interpretative 
problems  that will arise if one  attempts  to  go  beyond 
quantum  mechanics  and  encompass  alternative  pers- 
pectives  on  reality.  Finally,  the  subtle  experiences of 
reality  found,  for  example. in  meditative  states may 
have a fundamental role to play as data in future 
science. 
A possible aim of this  future  science  may  be  what 
the  Brahma  Kumaris  have  called  'combining  the 
power of science with the power of silence'. The 
power of science is the  capacity it gives us to  under- 
stand  nature in  very  specific terms, giving us thereby 
the  ability  to  control  nature  and  to  create very many 
of those  things  that we desire  to  have.  Experiencing 
silence.  on  the  other  hand, gives us a power whose 
achievements may be easier to see if they are de- 
fined in negative  terms, as for  example  the absence 
of conflict,  confusion,  fear  and  anger.  Up to now the 
two kinds of power have been separated and one 
could  almost say that  the  existence of only  the  one 
has been acknowledged officially. Now the future 
holds  out  to us the possibility of combining  the  two. 
Finally, in order  to  avoid  leaving  the  sceptical 
reader with the  idea  that  nothing of a  concrete 
nature is involved in the  things  about which I have 
been talking, I should like to comment very briefly 
on two examples of more concrete research. First, 
there  are now many  experiments  (e.g.  Wallace  and 
Benson 1972) which measure the effects of psycho- 
logical techniques  such  as  meditation  on  parameters 
which can be measured by more objective means. 
The implication of such research is that the mind- 
body  interaction is now  an  experimental  matter,  not 
just  one of philosophical  interest.  One  tangible  out- 
come of such  research is that it is becoming  accepted 
in the medical profession that it is not sufficient to 
treat  disease  on  a  purely physiological  basis. As yet, 
however,  there is little acceptance of the  idea  that  a 
spiritual  component  may  also  be involved in matters 
of health. 
My second  example is of a successful preliminary 
attempt, with which I have been involved, to put 
ideas from mysticism into a more concrete form. 
This consisted of a computer model of a develop- 
mental process, based on descriptions of the mind 
given by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. These descrip- 
tions were originally themselves derived from the 
Vedas, which are  some of the  earliest  expressions of 
mystical experience.  Circumstances have not yet 
allowed  the  continued  development of the  model  to 
a point where it might compete with the kind of 
model of the mind built by workers in the field of 
artificial intelligence. but the fact that the model 
worked  at all clearly  refutes  the  commonly  held view 
that mysticism is totally  devoid of meaningful 
content. 
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